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Indianapolis De
on:
Segregative Intent and the Interdistrict Remedy
I.

INTRODUCTION

The desegregation of this nation's public schools has, since 1954,
posed a series of nearly intractable problems for the federal judiciary. In that year, the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
1
Ferguson was discarded for the public schools, and a new era in
education and law was born in the Supreme Court opinion of Brown
2
v. Board of Education (Brown fl. Brown I was the result of a
carefully planned and executed campaign by the NAACP against
legally segregated school systems. 3 School districts from South
Carolina, Virginia, Kansas. and Delaware were initially confronted
and combined in this case.• The Supreme Court held "that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment" 5 because "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
8
unequal."
The Court said that the inequality perceived in segregated
7
schools stems not from the tangible aspects of education but rather
from the fact that "[s]egregation with the sanction of law ... has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
8
would receive in a racially integrated school system." When the in9
equality appears on the face of a state statute, the violation is ob•

163 u.s. 537 (1896).
2
347 u.s. 483 (1954) (Brown n.
3
AFRO·AMERICAN
HISTORY: PRIMARY SOURCES 365 (T. Frazier ed. 1970).
.
4
347 U.S. at 483 n. •. It is interesting to note that two of the cases- those from
Kansas and Delaware- were in northern states but were combined with the southern
cases because the segregation of the public school facilities was mandated by state law
in all four. See id. at 486·87 n.l.
5
/d. at 495.
"Id.
1
ld. at 492 .
8
ld. at 494.
'The following are examples of facially segregative laws: uThe Trustee or
Trustees of each township, town or city, shall organize the colored children into
separate schools, having aU the rights and privileges of other schools of the township."
Act of May 13, 1869, ch. 16, § 3 1869 Ind. Acts (Spec. Sess.) 41, as amended by Act of
March 5, 1877, ch. 81, § 1, 1877 Ind. Acts 124 (repealed by Act of March 8, 1949, ch.
186, §§ 1·8, 1949 Ind. Acts 603 (replaced by IND. CODE §§ 20-8.1-2-1 to -7 (1976))... It shall
be unlawful for pupils of one race to attend the schools provided by the boards of
1

•

•
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viously offensive and is clearly subject to the strictures of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment" Such laws inevitably
create a dual system of education wherein blacks and whites each
have their own schools. Therefore. problems of desegregating racially
segregated schools arise predominantly when state action is subtle
and the intent to create a dual system is less defined. This situation is
more likely to be confronted in the North than in the South because
0
southern legislators promulgated more facially segregative laws!
11
The Indianapolis desegregation case, spanning twelve years of
litigation, is, in many respects, a prototype of school desegregation
actions in the North" The actions creating the segregative condition
were often facially neutral. Yet, the case is unique because the inter12
district remedy suggested by District Judge Dillin in 1971 was
relatively innovative. Interdistrict remedies had rarely been con13
sidered, much less implemented, up to that time. The Indianapolis
litigation is also unique for the very reason that there was a nine·
year delay between the 1971 remedy and its "acceptance" in 1980 by
14
the Supreme Court. Because each school desegregation case encompasses a different factual situation, it is extremely difficult for the
judiciary, inexperienced in the field of education, to formulate a
coherent and cohesive body of law. The Indianapolis case can be
viewed both as a stage in the evolving case law on desegregation
and as one of the many disparate decisions ratified on a case-by-case
basis by a Court grappling with the almost insurmountable task
created by Brown I.
trustees for persons of another race.'' S.C. CODE § 59-63-10 (1976). uWhite and colored
children shall not be taught in the same school." VA. CoNST. of 1902 § 140 (repealed by
VA. CONST. art., VIII. § 1 (1971)).
10
Wright. Public School Desegregation: Legal Re_m edies for De Facto Sf3gregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285, 287 (1965).
11
The litigation included many published opinions: United Sta,tes v ~ Board of
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S~D. Ind. 1971), aff.d, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Indianapolis I]; United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind.) [hereinafter cited as Indianapolis II],
supp. mem. of decision, 368 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Ind. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Jn..
dianapolis Ill], aff'd in part, -r ev·d in part., and remanded, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929, on rem-and, 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Indianapolis IV], aff'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded
sub nom., Bowen v. United States, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), on remand, 573 F.2d 400 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978), on remand, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Indianapolis VJ, aff'd, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 114 (1980). References to the litigation in this Note will be to the specific bracketed
appellations.
2
t /ndianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. at 679.
3
l See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
14
United States v. Board of School Comm·rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 114 (1980).

I
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The purpose of this Note is to analyze the constitutional violation and the subsequent imposition of an interdistrict remedy in Indianapolis. The Indianapolis case will be compared with other case
law with respect to the finding of segregative intent and will be
reconciled with major decisions in other public school cases. This
reconciliation will point out the infirmities in the Indianapolis opinions which enable them to be harmonized with other decisions. This
Note will also indicate why the interdistrict remedy in Indianapolis
would today probably be accepted on a lesser standard of segregative intent than the lower courts' opinions indicate.
II.

NORTHERN SEGREGATION

The plight of black pupils in the North began with southern
racial attitudes and the great migrations of black families from the
South in the first decades of the twentieth century .15 Great numbers
of blacks, discouraged by agricultural conditions in the South and
enticed by the industrial North, arrived at their new urban homes
and found themselves segregated from their white neighbors. 16 Although some northern legislatures had enacted facially segregative
17
laws, most northern segregation was the result of private
discrimination, poverty, and a strong cultural identity creating
18
distinct black metropolitan ghettos.
Today, this isolation is perpetuated in school districts where
there exists a strong policy to send children to schools near their
homes: "[I]t is becoming apparent that perhaps the primary cause of
... segregation in urban schools is the socio-economic conditions of
the Negro .... Segregation results from adherence to the neighbor19
hood school assignment policy ." City schools become even more
racially identifiable as a result of "white flight"- the fleeing of
white families from inner cities to outlying areas. This type of
school segregation, called de facto segregation, is racial separation
20
caused by forces unconnected to any purposeful state action and as
such has traditionally not been considered amenable to remedy.. De

15

I

See AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY: PRIMARY SOURCES 249-51 (T. Frazier ed. 1970).
16
/d. "Between the years 1910 and 1920, the black population increased in Detroit
by 611.3 per cent, in Cleveland by 307.8 per cent, in Gary (Indiana) hy 1,283.6 per cent..
in Chicago by 148.2 per cent." /d. at 249.
17
Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 124, 124 (197 4).
8
' See Spear, The Origins of the Urban Ghetto, 1870-1915, in 2 KEY ISSUES IN THE
AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 153 (1971).
19
40 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 10, at 290.
20
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-68
(1978). Racially identifiable schools create the impression of a dual system.

'
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jure segregation, on the other hand, is created by intentional state
action and is unconstitutional and remediable. The equal protection
issues in northern school desegregation cases, therefore, revolve
around whether the current duality in schools was caused by the
more "benign" de facto segregation or by de jure segregation.
The emphasis upon finding segregative intent in northern cases
was born in the Supreme Court decision in Keyes v. School District
21
No. 1, Denver, the first major northern school case to reach the
Court after Brown I. According to the majority in Keyes, only those
acts that have the sanction of law and are intentionally segregative
22
violate the Constitution. Therefore, the focus of a court's scrutiny
in a northern case must be upon the actions which created a
segregated school system.
Northern schools sometimes became segregated by laws that
either required or permitted segregation by their specific terms, as
in the Kansas and Delaware lower court cases which led to Brown
23
/.
This situation makes the determination of the offense fairly simple.
But intentionally segregative state action is much harder to find
when facially neutral state action has created a segregated condition
or aggravated existing de facto segregation. Such apparently neu24
tral acts as gerryma.ndered attendance boundaries, optional atten27
25
26
dance zones, free transfer systems, and faculty segregation have
28
been imposed by local school boards, not by state statute. State
413 u.s. 189 (1973).
22
ld. at 198.
23
Brown v. Board of Educ .• 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951): Belton v. Gebhart, 32
Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (1952).
24
Gerrymandering the attendance boundaries for each school building on racial
lines to maintain segregation is a fairly common practice. See. e.g., Adams v. United
States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 88 (1980); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
2
r;Optional attendance zones give students in racially mixed residential areas the
opportunity to select the school of their choice; the student's decision is usually based
upon the predominant racial composition of the facility. E.g., United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 668 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
2flStudents are able to attend schools outside their attendance zones and even out_side their districts when a school board has instituted a system of free transfer. E.g.,
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) (crossing attendance lines); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.
Supp. 428, 433 (D. Del. 1975, (crossing district lines).
27
0nce a dual system becomes apparent, it is not uncommon for a school board to
assign teachers to buildings in accordance with their ·own race. E. g., United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs. 332 F. Supp. 655, 665 (S.D. Ind. 1971): Davis v. School Dist.,
309 F. Supp. 734, 743 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
u.s. 913 (1971).
28
For the purpose of charging "state action .. under the fourteenth amendment,
local school boards are considered agents of the state. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
21

'
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legislatures have also become involved by formulating laws which
29
change or in some manner affect school district boundaries. These
kinds of state action will often have a disproportionate impact upon
blacks, creating the appearance of a dual school system; however,
absent a showing of an intent or purpose to racially segregate, no
remediable cause of action exists.30
The problem in northern cases becomes further compounded if,
once de jure segregation within one district has been found, a
desegregation order within that district would be futile. This situation typically occurs when a court believes that an intradistrict
remedy either would accelerate "white flight" and create an iden·
31
tifiably black district or would merely rearrange an already racially
32
distinct district. In view of this dilemma, the utility of fashioning
an interdistrict metropolitan remedy becomes apparent. Under an
interdistrict remedy, adjacent, usually white, districts are united in
some manner with the offending district in order to cure the constitutional violation. The Indianapolis case revolves around this adjunct of the northern desegregation problem and exemplifies many
of the problems surrounding the imposition of an interdistrict
remedy.
III.

A.

BACKGROUND OF THE INDIANAPOLIS CASE

Segregation and Education in Indiana

Prior to its becoming a state, Indiana was a part of the Northwest Territory, an immense area of land ceded to the United States
.

16 (1958). In Indiana, actions by school corporations are state actions because the
schools are organized by the state's Department of Public Instruction. The state public
school system is a state institution, thereby making the individual corporations agents
of the state. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D. Ind.
1971)~

"United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Higgins v.
Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D.
Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
JtJSee Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). "We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate." /d. (emphasis in original).
81
United St.ates v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 676 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
See text accompanying notes 68-69 infra.
~~Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In the Milliken case, the District Court
abruptly rejected the proposed Detroit-only plans on the grounds that "while [they)
would provide a racial mix more in keeping with the Black-.W hite proportions of the
student population [they] would accentuate the racial identifiability of the (Detroit)
district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation:' Id. at.
738-39..
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by Virginia. Pro~slavery forces existed in the Indiana area, even
before the territorial cession, as a result of a combination of French,
34
British, and Virg·i nian colonial influences. The pro-slavery factions
were not defeated until statehood in 1816 when the state constitu35
tional convention adopted an anti-slavery clause. But old. racial attitudes were slow to die, and the Indiana General Assembly, as well
as the constitutional conventions of 1816 and 1851. promulgated
patently discriminatory statutes, some of which were not repealed
36
until 1965. Blacks were separated from whites in most public
37
places until after World War 1! and were often the subject of pri38
vate discrimination in the housing market. Early Indiana legislators even went so far as to pass laws to exclude blacks and mulat39
tos from the state altogether. With this historical background, the
problems that arose in education are easily understandable.
In Indiana, the right to education was traditionally considered a
right conferred only upon white citizens of the state. 40 It was not
until 1869, subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution, that education had to be provided
41
for blacks, and the initial legislation required separate schools for
42
black students. In 1877, the policy was made permissive by allow3
ing integration when separate schools were not available.' In 1949,
legislation was adopted which prohibited school segregation and included a gradual desegregation plan.•• But by then, de jure segregation had already done its damage.
33
'

.

G.

33

.

COTTMAN, CENTENNIAL HISTORY AND HANDBOOK OF INDIANA

37 (1915).

34

8. BoNDt JR., THE CIVILIZATION OF THE OLD NORTHWEST 154 (1934).
ss/d. at 171. The anti-slavery clause that was adopted was from the Government

Ordinance of 1787 which for.m ed the basic colonial structure of the Territory. /d. at 10,
171. The clause had already been adopted in Ohio. /d. at 171.
38
/ndianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. at 660. One law, not repealed until 1965, declared
marriages between whites and blacks void. 1 REV. STAT. ch. 67, § 2 (1852), cited in 332
F. Supp. at 660.
.
37
332 F. Supp. at 661. Such places included public hospitals, theatres, and state
parks. /d.
38
/d. at 662-63~
39
1ND. CONST. of 1851, art. XIII, § 1 (1852), cited in 332 F. Supp. at 661.
40
See, e.g., Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 334-35 (1850).
••Indianapolis /, 322 F. Supp. at 663-64.
42
Aet of May 13, 1869, ch. 16, § 8, 1869 Ind. Acts 41. See note 9 supra.
43
See note 47 infra.
••Act of Mar. 8, 1949, ch. 186. 1949 Ind. Acts 603 (currently codified at IND. CoDE
§ 20·8.1-2-1 (1976)). This Act reads in part:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Indiana to pro·
vide, furnish, and make avai1able equal, non-segregated, non-discriminatory
educational opportunities and facilities for all regardless of race, creed, national origin, color or sex . . . and to abolish, eliminate and prohibit
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The effect of the discriminatory legislative acts was most noticeable in larger urban areas, particularly Gary and Indianapolis,
where the black populations were more concentrated and isolated.
Although the school boards of both Gary an:d Indianapolis adopte·d
policies that seemed to foster segregation, only Indianapolis has ul45
timately been the subject of a desegregation order. The reason the
focus has been on Indianapolis beomes apparent when one looks at
the Indianapolis schools apart from the rest of the state.

B.

Segregat.ion in Indianapolis Schools

From the beginning of state-supported education in Indiana. de
46
jure elementary school segregation existed in Indianapolis; however, between 1877 and 1927, blacks and whites were allowed to go
to the h.igh school of their choice. Indianapolis high schools were integrated during this period because the city had no separate high
schools for blacks, and the 1877 legislative amendment to the segre·
gration statute allowed integration if there were no separate
7
schools_. In 1927, at the instigation of the Indianapolis Chamber of
Commerce, Crispus Attucks High School was opened, and all black
high school students were compelled to attend that school regard48
less of the distance they were required to travel. This new facility
solidified and perpetuated the dual school system in Indianapolis.
The school board failed to take advantage of the gradual desegrega,49
tion plan offered by the legislature in 1949 and thus later en·
countered problems that might have been avoided.
One of the critical dates in the Indianapolis case was 1954 when
50
Brown I was decided. The Indianapolis school board, although adopting the policy of the 1949 statute, did not incorporate the true spirit
segregated and separate schools or school districts on the basis of race, creed
or c.o lor . . . .
!d. at § 1, 1949 Ind. Acts at 604. The desegregation of previously segregated schools
was to be accomplished on a grade-by-grade basis so that effects of discrimination
would be phased out rather than .flatly abandoned. /d. at § 3, 1949 Ind. Acts at. 604.
45
An action was brought against the Gary schools in 1963, but the complaint was
dismissed for lack of a constitutional violation. Schools in the city were racial1y identifiable, but the court of appeals attributed this circ_u mstance to de facto causes and
held that there was no intent to discriminate. Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209,
213 (7th Cir. 1963).
48
/ndianapolis /, 332 F. Supp. at 664.
47
/d. The amendment stated in pertinent part u[t)hat in case there may not be
provided separate schools for the colored children, then such colored children shall be
allowed to attend the public schools with white children." Act of Mar. 5, 1877, ch. 81, §
l, 1877 Ind. Acts 124.
48
332 F. Supp. at 664.
49
See note 44 supra.
!'10332 F. Supp. at 657-58.

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

806

[Vol. 14:799

of school desegregation into its actions. Construction policies and
transfer plans tended to minimize any efforts at desegregation by a
board which, until 1949, had built separate schools in racially
distinct neighborhoods and had completely segregated the schools'
51
faculties. In the 1952-53 academic year, the board froze attendance
boundaries along racially segregated residential lines.52 By 1954, the
Indianapolis system was in the throes of nineteenth and twentieth
.
century de jure segregation and could well have been one of the test
cases in Brown I.
The other crucial date in the litigation, as in most desegregation
cases, 53 was the time of trial in 1968. Between 1954 and 1968, the Indianapolis school board's policies tended to maintain the dual nature
of the 1954 system as well as create new segregative conditions. As
racially identifiable neighborhoods grew, the school board added
new schools or enlarged existing schools in line with the racial com54
position of the neighborhood. Thus, racially identifiable schools
were created and perpetuated. Other segregative actions by the
55
school board included using optional attendance zones, busing
'
56
students to same-race schools when other schools were closer, and
changing attendance boundaries approximately 350 times, with ninety
57
p_e rcent of those changes furthering segregation. The board was
not wholly to blame for the perpetuation of the dual system within
IPS during this period. The board faced a radically changing racial
58
59
population, new low-rent housing projects, and lack of cooperation
by local officials with respect to zoning and use of city land for
60
schools. However, only the school board,s actions became the initial
focus of litigation that lasted twelve years.
•

C.

The Indianapolis Litigation

In 1968, the United States Department of Justice brought suit in
the federal district court for the Southern District of Indiana
against the Indianapolis school board alleging denial of equal protec51

/d. at 665-66.
52[d.
Mfhe 1979 Supreme Court opinions concerning Columbus, and Dayton, Ohio, give
less weight to the condition of a school system at the time of trial if de jure segregation existed in 1954 and had not been completely dismantled at the time of trial. See
text accompanying notes 149-55 infra.
64

332 F. Supp. at 667-69.
55
/d. at 668.
~/d.

at 669.
57
/d. at 670. ·
&8Jd. at 672-73.
5
'/d. at 673-74.
00
/d. at 67 4.
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61

tion of the laws. In light of the actions taken by the board both
before and after Brown I, the trial court had no difficulty inferring
the necessary segregative intent and holding that the board, acting
as agent of the state of Indiana, was maintaining a de jure segregated school system at the time of trial. 62 The decision upon the
issue of segregation was quickly rendered credible by its affirmation
in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the subsequent denial
63
of certiorari by the Supreme Court. The remed-y suggested in Indianapolis I by District Judge Dillin was the real source of controversy: Proper desegregation of the Indianapolis public schools
64
would. be best achieved
by
an
interdistrict
remedy.
An interdistrict remedy had rarely been suggested or ordered
65
before 1971. District Judge Dillin, to test the efficacy of such relief,
established an interim order for immediately dismantling the dual
system within the Indianapolis district (IPS) and required the plaintiff to secure the joinder of outlying school districts as parties
defendant to better facilitate the shaping of an interdistrict
66
remedy . The court's rationale was that desegregation within the
district itself just would not be effective- "in the long haul, it won't
67
work." Because 98.5°/o of the black population of the county lived
68
within IPS, the judge feared that desegregation of only those
schools would soon result in an undesirable racial balance of forty
percent minority pupils in the schools, leading to incr,e ased "white
69
flight." Therefore, combining outer, basically white, districts with
IPS would be the most effective remedial measure.
The basis for this preliminary decision was a piece of Indiana
legislation passed in 1968, which prevented the growth of the IPS
district into predominantly white residential areas. The General
.

.

/d. at 656. The Justice Department is empowered to bring an action under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in school desegre.g ation cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a), (b) (1976).
82
332 F. Supp. at 677-78.
03See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81, 88 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973). See generally Marsh. The Indianapolis Experience: The
Anatomy of a Desegregation Case, 9 IND. L. REV. 897, 932~33 (1976).
84
332 F. Supp. 680-81.
65 An interdistrict remedy had been ordered the year before in Arkansas when a
white district was forced to annex a smaller black district because the boundaries had
been drawn with the intent to segregate. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ .• 429 F.2d 364
(8th Cir. 1970).
68
332 F. Supp. at 679-81.
67
/d. at 678.
GSJd. at 663.
89
/d. at 676. Judge Dillin believed that a 40°/o tipping factor would create an iden·
tifiably black district rather than just a dual system. ld.
11
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70

Assembly's action, informally entitled "Uni-Gov ," allowed governmental reorganization in Indiana counties having first-class cities. 71
Indianapolis, being the state's only first-class city, was consolidated
72
with most of the other civil governments in Marion County in
order to have a larger pool of resources for metropolitan planning
73
and problem-solving. In Indiana, the boundaries of any school
system were traditionally and statutorily coterminous with any an74
nexations to the civil city. However, two weeks before Uni-Gov
was approved, the legislature repealed the part of the statute pro75
viding for the expansion of school district lines in first-class cities.
Thus, IPS remained frozen with the old city boundaries and could
not expand to include those outer districts which were, by 1968,
76
becoming identifiably white. The principal controversy after the
Supreme Court refused to hear Indianapolis I was the legality of the
interdistrict remedy which was necessary to overcome the impact of
Uni-Gov.
77
18
Indianapolis // and Indianapolis Il/ included the outlying
school districts within and without Marion County as added defendants. The district court confirmed its choice of remedy by finding
79
that an Indianapolis-only plan would be unsatisfactory . Further,
although the outlying districts had every right to resist school
reorganization into one metropolitan system, they were nevertheless
required to comply with an interdistrict remedy because the frozen
IPS boundary lines made desegregation within the district virtually
80
impossible. District Judge Dillin then granted interim relief from
busing blacks out of IPS in order to afford the legislature time to
°Consolidated First-Class Cities and Counties Act, ch. 173, 1969 Ind. Acts 357
(codified at IND. CoDE §§ 18-4-1-1 to -5-4 (Supp. 1980)).
71
Dortch v. Lugar, 255 Ind. 545, 560, 266 N .E.2d 25, 35 (1971). In this case, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. See generally 41 IND.
L.J. 101 (1971).
72
Beech Grove, Lawrence and Speedway were officially excluded for most purposes except for the right to vote in Indianapolis elections. Indianapolis /, 332 F. Supp.
at 676 n.93.
13
See 47 IND. L.J. 101. 102 (1971).
74
Act of Mar. 9, 1931, ch. 94, § I. 1931 Ind. Acts 291.
75
IND. CoDE §§ 20-3-14-1 to -11 (1976). In these sections, Acl of Mar. 6, 1961, ch.
186, 1961 Ind. Acts 101 was amended by Act of Feb. 25, 1969, ch. 52, 1969 Ind. Acts 57.
76
See 332 F. Supp. at 663.
77
368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
78
368 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Ind. 1973), rev 'd in part, aff'd in part, and remanded, 503
F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
79
Indianapolis II, 368 F. Supp. at 1198.
80
/d. at 1203-04. By 1973, the date of Indianapolis II and III, IPS was already
41.1 Ofo black, indicating to Judge Dillin that perhaps the tipping point in the city was
much lower than he had originally believed. Jd. at 1198.
7
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formulate some kind of permanent plan to effect school desegrega81
tion in Marion County . On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision with respect to districts
outside Uni-Gov boundaries and remanded the rest of the case 82 for
reconsideration in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
83
Milliken v. Bradley.
In Milliken, the Court reversed an interdistrict metropolitan
remedy in Detroit and demanded that an interdistrict constitutional
violation be shown before such relief could be granted. "Specifically,
it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or
local school districts, or of a single school district have been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation .... [W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional
84
wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." Therefore, on remand of
the Indianapolis case, the district court was required to find not only
segregative effect but also an actual constitutional violation causing
that condition.
85
In the 1975 district court decision in Indianapolis /V, the Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis (HACI) was an added
defendant. The agency had been joined because all low-rent housing
projects built under its auspices were within the IPS boundaries
although it had the authority to build within five miles of the city
86
limits. Further evidence was heard on "the effect ... of housing
and zoning laws, rules, regulations and customs in Marion County,
Indiana and its various political subdivisions upon the de jure
87
segregation of IPS." Ultimately, Judge Dillin held that a limited in88
terdistrict remedy was warranted by the additional evidence and
81

/d. at 1208. The court outlined possible alternatives available t.o the legislature
in its Indianapolis Ill supplemental memorandum. Indianapolis ///, 368 F. Supp. 1223.
82
503 F.2d 68, 86 (7th Cir. 1974).
83
418
717 (1974).
84
/d. at 745.
85
419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
86
/d. at 182.
81
/d. This evidence was heard in accordance with Justice Stewart's concurring opin~
ion in Milliken:
Were it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed t.o the
separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines, ... (hy I
transfer of school units between districts, . . . or by purpose ful. racially
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for
transfer of pupils across district lines or for rest ruct.uring of district lines
might well be appropriate.
418 U.S. at 755.
88
/ndianapolis IV, 419 F. Supp. at 183. The remedy was limited to transferring
black students out of IPS. The Indiana legislature by that time had passed a law that
accommodated such a remedy with the transferor district paying the t.ransf(~r..~P
districts for tuition. IND. ConE §§ 20·8.1-6.5-1 to -10 (1976). _
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the "violation, of Uni-Gov, and he enjoined HACI from locating any
89
more housing within IPS boundaries. This decision satisfied the
court of appeals. The Supreme Court, however, caught in a revolution of the law of equal protection, vacated and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of two then recent decisions concerning
90
discriminatory intent.
'

IV.

THE INDIANAPOLIS REMEDY AND SEGREGATIVE INTENT

The Supreme Court referred the lower courts to the equal protection cases of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous92
91
ing Development Corp. and Washington v. Davis. Neither of these
93
cases deal with school desegregation, but both were important with
respect to the determination of segregative intent.
In view of Arlington Heights and Davis, the discriminatory intent in IPS's practices and the disproportionate impact of Uni-Gov
and HACI actions could not support an interdistrict remedy without
94
a showing of a purposeful interdistrict violation. In Indianapolis
95
V, therefore, the district court was required to look for segregative
89

419 F. Supp. at 183. 186.
The eviden·ce in the record, as taken in all hearings, clearly shows that
the suburban Marion County units of government, including the added
defendant school corporations. have consistently resisted the movement of
black citizens or black pupils into their territory. They have resisted school
consolidation. they resisted civil annexation so long as civil annexation carried school annexation with it, they ceased resisting civil annexation only
when the Uni-Gov Act made it. clear that. the schools would not be involved.
Suburban Marion Count.y has r esisted the erection of public housing projects
out.side IPS territory. suburban Marion County officials have refused to
cooperate with HUD on t.he location of such projects, and the customs and
usages of hot h th~ officials and inhabitants of such areas has been t.o
discourage blacks from ~t~eking to purchase or rent homes there in . . . .
/d. at 182-83.
~ /rulianapolis IV. !141 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Bowen v. lJ nit.ed StatPs, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). Circuit.
Judge Tont. . 's disspnt in t ht.. . court of appeals opinion foreshadowed the subsequent
Supreme Court dt\cision. !141 F.2d at 1224. ,
~ 1 429 u.s. 252 ( 1977).
!l:!426 u.s. 229 (1976).
~: A rlington Heights involvPd a claim of residential 1.oning discrimination. In
Washington v. Davis, t h~ plaintiffs alleged discrimination in the hiring practices of the
wa.shingt on . n.c. ml't ropolit an police depart mt. . nt.
~··'
The school des<~grcgat.ion cases have . .. adhered to the basic equal
prntt.•ct ion principiP that t ht.~ inviciious qualit.y of a law claimed t.o be racially
diseriminatory must ultimately ht\ traced to a racially discriminatory purpost.... That t hPrt.. . are hot h prt~dominant.ly hlack and predominant.ly white
school~ in a <~ommunit.v is not alone violative of t.he Equal Protection Clause.
Washington v. Oavis, 426 U.S. al 240 (1976).
~~456 F. Su pp. 18:3 (S.D. Inrl. 1978).
11
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intent in those acts which tended to prevent effective metropolitan
desegregation. The court did not have to find that segregative intent was the sole motivation for the acts- the existence of any
96
segregative intent would support an interdistrict remedy.
The court's burden was further lessened because there was no
need to find that the outer districts had intentionally contributed to
or caused the IPS school segregation. This requirement, established
91
by the Court in Milliken, was obviated by the Indiana General
Assembly which had provided an interdistrict transfer remedy that
98
could be imposed without culpability of the transferee districts.
Thus, Indianapolis V dealt exclusively with finding segregative intent in Uni-Gov and HACI actions.
There were neither facially discriminatory statutes nor express
statements of racial purpose present so the district court examined
Uni-Gov and HACI using methods by which intent could be inferred.
The court began its inquiry by examining the disproportionate im99
pact of both forces. It reasoned:
"The impact of the official action- whether it 'bears more.
heavily on one race than another,' ... -may provide an im·
portant starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the eJfect
of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face ...." 100

After looking at impact? the trial court~ using criteria suggested
in Arlington Heights, examined the passage of Uni·Gov for evidence
of a segregative purpose. 101 This standard generally guides a court in
"
[A plaintiff is not required) to prove that the· challenged action rested
solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern. or even that a particular purpose
was the ''dominant'· or "primary., one~
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265 (footnote
omitted).
e1Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 745. In Milliken, the Court stated that a eon·
stitutional violation could be proven either by discriminatory acts in one district -causing segregation in an adjacent district or by racially identifiable district lines drawn by
the state. /d.
88
lndianapalis V. . 456 F. Supp. at 190-91. The statute provides that pupil transfers
.
can be effectuated if: (l) the transferor corporation has violated equal protection, (2t a
unitary system cannot be implemented within the offending eorporation, and (3) the
court is compelled to order such transfers under the fourteenth amendm·e nt. IND. CoDE
§ 20-8.1-6.5-1 (1976).
"456 F. Supp. at 185.
100
/d. (quoting 429 U~S. at 26.6).
0
' 'The Arlington Heights case suggests that, besides impact, five other factors
could be relevant to inferring intent: (1) the historical background of the decision,
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considering the "totality of the relevant facts" from which it can
glean an inference of intent. In the instance of Uni-Gov, there was
convincing evidence that segregation had been a factor in the deci·
sion to freeze the IPS boundaries. First, the court recounted the
history of white-black relations in Indiana as well as that of In103
dianapolis' dual school system. It then considered the sequence of
events leading to the adoption of the Uni-Gov act and emphasized
that the partial repeal of the statute allowing expansion of school
104
boundaries occurred just prior to passage of U ni-Gov . Moreover
the court heard testimony to the effect that the act would not have
105
been passed if IPS were to grow with the e-ity. Next, District
Judge Dillin examined substantive departures from prior policy. The
legislature had been eliminating remnants of racially discriminatory
laws since 1949 when it appeared to reverse that progress by
106
repealing the pertinent section of the annexation statute. From
this pattern of behavior, the district court found that Uni-Gov was
passed, at least in part, with the purpose of maintaining interdistrict
school segregation. 107
The court found segregative intent in the actions of HACI in a
108
different manner. Using a test employed by the Sixth Circuit and
other courts of appeals, District Judge Dillin held that a presumption of segregative intent was raised because the "natural, probable
and foreseeable result of erecting public housing projects wholly
within IPS territory would be to concentrate poor blacks in such
projects and thus to increase or perpetuate public school segregation within IPS." 109 HACI failed to affirmatively establish that its
policies were racially neutral, and it too was found to have commit110
ted an int'erdistrict constitutional violation.
To remedy these intentional violations, the district court enjoined
HACI from further building within IPS and reinstated its 1975
order to transfer a certain percentage of blacks from IPS to the
t

(2) any ..specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision/' (3) substantive departures in policy, (4) departures from usual procedure, and (5) any administrative or legislative history. 429 U.S. at 267-68.
102
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
103
456 F. Supp. at 186-87.
104
/d. at 187.
105
/d. This testimony was given by then-Mayor Richard Lugar.
106
/d. at 188.
101Jd.
108
See NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ .• 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied. 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
09
.. 456 F. Supp. at 189.
1t0Jd.
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outlying districts within Uni-Gov's boundaries (the county Jines).
The court determined the number of pupils to be transferred by
calculating approximately how many children would have gone to
112
schools in outlying districts absent the HACI violation.
113
Except with respect to two districts within Uni-Gov limits, the
114
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's order
by holding that the interdistrict remedy was justified because of the
115
violations by both Uni-Gov and HACI. The court also stated that
the form of the order was proper in light of the "specific incre116
mental effects" of HACI's actions. The court of appeals emphasized
that even though there would be some difficulty determining the exact segregative effects attributable to Uni-Gov alone, a remedy
17
could have been ordered commensurate with the impact! The opinion further indicated that the lower court had the power, if
necessary, to transfer students from outlying districts into IPS
because the state action had had interdistrict effects. 118 Whethe.r
these measures will be implemented is difficult to determine.
Nonetheless, the district court's order was deemed effective on Oc·
119
tobe.r 6, 1980, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

V.

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND SEGREGATIVE INTENT

A.

Generally

The various dispositions of the lndi~napolis case demonstrate
the difficulty inherent in finding segregative intent in desegregation
cases. In accordance with Keyes, segregative intent must be found
2
in order to establish a constitutional violation! °Courts have had little
difficulty discovering segregative intent in the South because of
'

11

'/d. at. 191.

uz/d. at 190. This approach had recently been approved by the Supreme Court in
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). The Court remanded the case to
the qistrict court to limit the desegregation remedy to effect the school distribution
that would have been present without the constitutional violation. ld. at 420·21.
11
3'fhe Beech Grove and Speedway judgments were vacated and remanded to
determine whether HACI had jurisdiction to operate in those locales. United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 114,
115 (1980).
114
/d. at 1117.
n 5Jd. at 1111.
u'Jd. at 1112-14.
111
/d. at 1113.
118
/d. at 1115.
119
Bowen v. Buckley, 101 S. Ct. 114 (1980).
120
See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
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121

numerous facially discriminatory actions. To date, however, the
Court has not explained how lower courts in northern cases are to
find segregative intent absent such actions. Instead, the Court
122
refers them to non-school cases such as Arlington Heights (hous123
(employment). Thus, lower
ing/zoning) and Washington v. Davis
tribunals are left to their own devices in finding purposeful segrega-.
tion in school cases.
Another reason courts have experienced difficulty finding
segregative intent in school cases is that the case law is still evolving. The body of decisions regarding this requirement is growing
but is by no means creating a logical pattern.
1. Methods of Finding Intent.- Courts and commentators
generally discern two separate approaches for finding segregative
intent: the subjective method and the objective method. However,
these labels are actually misnomers. The categories are better named
for the type of evidence used by the courts in finding segregative intent: direct evidence and indirect evidence.
The purported subjective approach for finding discriminatory intent involves the examination of the "subjective" motivation of the
124
officials promulgating the actions. Intent is established under this
theory by means of direct evidence of discriminatory motives. Such
evidence includes facially discriminatory statutes and overt expressions of racial motivation made by the persons involved in the
25
decision-making.' However, it is highly unlikely that there actually
is a test for subjective motivation; segregative intent is subjective
motivation.. Facially segregative actions are automatically unconstitutional because segregation is not a proper legislative goal.
When the motivation is not readily apparent, however, other factors
have to be entered into evidence from which an actor's subjective
126
motivation, or intent, can be inferred. Courts then use indirect indicia of intent which can be used as evidence of motivation.
.

.

.

'

See generally text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
122
429 u.s. 252 (1977).
.
123
426 u.s. 22,9 (1976).
124
See Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 725, 733 (1977); Note, R-eading the Mind of the
School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J.
317, 321 (1976).
125
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 197 4), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975) (pattern of segregative action included ustatements of express intention not to
counter anti-integration sentiment").
128
0ne court has expressly stated this concept. "[W)e treat the District Court's
finding of a lack of racial motivation as irrelevant in the face of his findings of foresC(!·
able effect [based on objective evidence]." Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ. , 512
F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1975).
121
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Indirect evidence of segregative intent includes such acts as gerrymandered boundary lines and free transfer systems. These acts can be
motivated by legitimate objective educational reasons as well as by
covert segregative intent, hence the term "objective" approach.
However, when direct evidence of discrimination is not available,
courts must rely on this indirect evidence to infer segregative intent. Thus, it is apparent that courts do not rely on subjective or objective approaches to find segregative intent. Rather, they rely upon
the two types of evidence these approaches are based on.
Finding intent from indirect evidence is the most commonly used
127
approach in northern desegregation cases. This method has given
rise to several so-called ..objective" tests and is, for that reason, the
more successful procedure for finding segregative purpose in widely
differing fact situations. The analysis using indirect evidence has
129
128
been called "objective intent," "institutional intent," the "fore131
130
seeability test," "cumulative violation," "the Omaha presump33
tion,"132 and even "totality of the facts" test! Regardless of the
name appended to it, the approach is essentially the same: The court
looks at what was done, how it was done, and who was affected.
One of the indirect analyses that has been used successfully is
whether segregation or maintenance of existing segregation was a
134
natural, foreseeable result of the official action. Another ·of the
more comprehensive indirect analyses is for a court to look at patterns of official conduct, such as drawing school attendance lines
135
that maintain or increase segregation or planning school construction.136 Such patterns are not mutually exclusive, and many practices
that tend to segregate are often combined and viewed as a whole.
131
For such a case, the decision in Washington v. Davis suggests that
"an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
127

See, e.g., cases cited notes 134-36 & 141 infra.
128
See Note, supra note 124, at 328.

129

/d. at 334.
130
See Comment, supra note 124, at 732.
141
/d. at 734.
132
/d. at 735.
133
Note, Finding Intent in School Segregation Constitutional Violations, 28 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 119, 162 (1977).
134
N AACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F .2d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir .), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977); United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 946 (1975); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., N.Y. School Dist. #21, 512
F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
~Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, 351 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.
Minn. 1972).
1
38M organ v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d at 592-93.
137
426
229 (1976) .
1
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138

totality of the relevant facts." Similarly, a court can find that a
school board was motivated, at least in part, by a segregative purpose by looking for "institutional intent." This route is very much
139
like the one used in Arlington Heights and Indianapolis V except
that the court looks solely at the acts of the school board and at
whether a less segregative alternative is available absent a strong
educational justification for the choice made. 140 The various tests
also subsume a method known as "the Omaha presumption" in
which a presumption of intent arises when official acts or omissions
have created a foreseeably segregative condition. The presumption
may only be rebutted if the defendant board can establish that dis141
criminatory intent was not a motivating factor .
Though this
method was used in Indianapolis V for the HACI offense, the
Supreme ·court questioned the validity of this presumption in
42
1979.1 It appears, therefore, that the prior success of this test is
probably attributable to the weight of the indirect evidence.
Although each test has distinctive features, they are virtually
interchangeable and often not clearly distinguishable. Rather than
searching for the "best" method or waiting for the Supreme Court
to select one, courts have required plaintiffs to bring forth as much
evidence as possible that appears to indicate segregation. The
courts have then judged that evidence by whatever method suits
their tastes or as equitably as possible. Generally, school boards
which have engaged in a great number of suspect acts will be required to dismantle the effects of those acts . Fewer and unconnected
actions will usually not require a remeay because they are often ex·
plainable by de facto conditions. Whatever approach is used, the
Supreme Court has usually demonstrated its amenability to the approach by denying certiorari. 143
38

/d. at 242.
39
' See note 101 supra.
0
'• See Note, supra note 124, at 334-35.
141
United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535~36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 946 (1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See generally Note, Intent to Segregate: The Omaha
Presumption, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775 (1976); Comment, supra note 124, at 735.
uzReferring to the Sixth Circuit's emphasis upon Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of
Educ.• the Court said:
We have never held that as a general proposition the foreseeability of segregative consequences makes out a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination and shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendants if
they are to escape judgment; and even more clearly there is no warrant in
our cases for holding that such foreseeability routinely shifts the burden of
persuasion to the defendants.
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman. 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979).
43
' See cases cited notes 125, 134 & 171.
'
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2. Recent Trends in the Supreme Court. -The Court's tacit approval speaks well of the lower courts' treatment of such a sensitive
issue, but it also indicates wise restraint from establishing any one
standard as the rule. Because of the great disparity in the history,
school organization, disputed official acts, and other facts relevant to
each case, a single rule would be virtually impossible to formulate.
The Court's restraint is even more apparent when one considers
some of the decisions from the Fifth Circuit. Because it is situated in
the South, this particular court of appeals has had to deal with
144
numerous school desegregation cases. The constitutional issue, as
that court views it, does not necessarily depend upon the de jure/de
facto distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Keyes. The court
145
in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District stated
that "while [discriminatory motive and purpose] may reinforce a finding of effective segregation, [they] are not necessary ingredients of
constitutional violations in the field of public education. We ... hold
that the racial and ethnic segregation that exists ... is unconstitu146
tional- not de facto, nor de jure, but unconstitutional."
The Keyes decision, requiring intent, would seem to preclude
reliance on Cisneros. However, the Court declined to hear Cisneros
four days after the decision in Keyes was handed down. Commentators•" and at least two Justices 148 have suggested either that the
de jure/de facto distinction has no merit or that de facto segregation
should be dismantled also. Generally, their arguments are the same:
Segregation is just as harmful whether it is de facto or de jure.
Although the Supreme Court has never espoused the Fifth Circuit's approach, two recent cases have diminished the significance of
the de jure/de facto distinction to some extent. In Columbus Board
149
of Education v. Penick and Dayton Board of Education v. Brink50
man (Dayton //)( the Court in essence ruled that if racially iden·
tifiable schools existed in 1954 and still exist at time of trial, the
school board has failed in its affirmative duty to dismantle the dual
a•see generally F.

McGouGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH xii, 565-72 (1978).
145
467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
146
/d. at 149. .
141
See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972); 40 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 10; Note, De Facto
School Segregation and the "Sta.te Action" Requirement: A Suggested NeuJ Approach, 48 IND. L.J. 304 (1973).
148
ln Keyes, both Justices Powell and Douglas decried the use of t.he distinction
because it did not ameliorate segregation caused by a neighborhood school policy
where there was private housing discrimination. 413 U.S. at 214-53.
149
443 u.s. 449 (1979).
150
443 u.s. 526 (1979).
.
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system, and an appropriate remedy must be imposed.

151

The determination of present intent in the Columbus and Dayton districts was
based upon the foreseeable consequences and impact of official actions which showed that the, boards were perpetuating past
segregative practices rather than eliminating them.i 52 This method
of :finding present intent was approved as early as 1973, in Keyes,
when the Court stated that:
a connection between past segregative acts and present
segregation may be prese·n t even when not apparent .... Intentional school segregation in the past may have been a factor in creating a natural environment for the growth of further segregation. Thus, if respondent School Board cannot
disprove segregative intent,. it can rebut the prima facie case
only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create
53
or contribute to the current segregated condition ... }
The approach in Columbus and Dayton II is best described in a recent review:
·
The approach to . . . school desegregation that the Supreme Court endorses ... has four elements: first, the existence of identifiably black schools in the school system in
1954[;] ... [s]econd, a legal determination that the existence
of such schools in 1954 . . . [created] a continuing constitutional duty to eliminate identifiably black schools[;] . . .
[t]hird, an intensive and detailed examination of school
system actions since 1954 in order to determine whether the
school system has taken all feasible actions to eliminate the
identifiably black schools[;] . . . [f]ourth, the conclusion that
the only way to eliminate the identifiably black character of
some schools is to modify· the neighborhood school policy
through appropriate racial transfers . . . so that no school
154
has a distinctly black enrollment . . . .
The Court's current view. then, is that when a district combines
the vestiges of a 1954 de jure situation with actions which have the
foreseeable consequence of disparate racial impact, the system has
not been effectively dismantled. The Court may have "accepted" any
mode Qf finding intent so long as a lower court's decision was not
clearly erroneous, but its focus since Brown I has been primarily
•

151

443 U.S. at 461: 443 U.S. at 541.
152
443 U.S. at 464; 443 U.S. at 536 n.9.
15
a413 U.S. at 211.
154
Kitch, The Return of Color·Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton,
and Columbus. 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2-3 (1980).
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upon a school board's affirmative duty to dismantle a dual system
rather than the board's purpose in maintaining it. 155
It is with reference to this attitude that the Indianapolis interdistrict remedy
can
be
understood.
Circuit
Judge
Tone's
1979
dis•
sent in Indian.apolis V is probably more correct than the majority's
rationale when he states that "today's decision cannot, I think, be
reconciled with .the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation."158 The Court's current trend away from the importance of
the de jure/de facto distinction explains part of the reason why the
Indianapolis remedy was not overturned. The Court's disposition of
the Indianapolis case is further understood when one considers
other interdistrict cases.
B.

Interdistrict Remedies
.

1. Interdistrict Remedy and Segregative Intent. -Milliken v.
157
Bradley
is the first and essentially the only opinion by the
Supreme Court on the interdistrict remedy and public schools.
According to Milliken, plaintiffs must show an interdistrict violation
with an interdistrict effect in order to obtain such a remedy! 58
Typically, intentional acts of an adjacent school district or racially
drawn district lines constitute such a violation and elicit the
169
necessary effect. In Milliken, the Court could find neither type of
180
violation. Detroit, therefore, had to dismantle its own de jure
161
system, but as a district it remained identifiably black.
Many courts have tried to avoid this result, especially in the
North where urban areas have a great concentration of minorities.
Their cure for the problem has often been to initially suggest, and
even order, interdistrict relief as soon as they find that the "city"
district is operating a dual system. The interdistrict actions found to
support the remedy generally fall into one, if not both, of the
Milliken categories-district actions or legislative redistricting.
•

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. at 220-21 (Powell. J .• concurring in
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39. 41 (1971): Swann v.
Charlotte·Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971);. Green v. County School Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (uSchool Boards such as the respondent then [1954]
operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the af·
firmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch .").
••Indianapolis V. 637 F.2d at 1130.
117
418 u.s. 717 (1974) •
•.,/d. at 744-45.
••Jd. at 745. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
110
418 U.S. at 748.
•••JtL at 759.
'
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There is also the occasional anomaly, as in Indianapolis, in which
housing is deemed to create an interdistrict effect. However,, for a
court to order any interdistrict remedy, it must find the interdistrict act violative . That is, the act must be accompanied by
segregative intent.
Segregative intent, as well as an interdistrict act, were missing
in Milliken. As in the intradistrict cases, however, the Court failed
to elucidate the standards a court is to use to determine segregative
intent. Thus, courts are left with the same direct and indirect
methods used in finding intradistrict violations. In some cases, these
methods are appropriate; in others, their use seems less reliable, if
they are actually used at all.
2. Interdistrict Violations by School Districts.- The easiest interdistrict violations to ascertain are those that are blatantly, if not
expressly, segregative in purpose. The inte·r district order in Louisville162 was designed to remedy just such practices. The Louisville
district was one of three school districts in Jefferson County, two of
which were operating state-mandated dual systems at the time of
163
trial. Before Brown I, the two latter districts had actively engaged
in segregative practices by disregarding boundary lines and
transferring blacks into an inner city school for blacks because the
164
county system had no such school. The lines were also ignored
when one high school. belonging to the Louisville district, was built
within another district's system, and white students from both
165
districts attended it. In an action for interdistrict relief, the court
held that prior disregard for district lines "for the purpose and with
the actual effect of segre,gating school children among the public
schools of the county on the basis of race" required an interdistrict
166
remedy.
School boards have been involved in other more ingenious
methods of segregation, some of which did not require courts to infer
161
intent. ln Lee v. Macon County Board of Educ(ttion and Wright v.
168
Council of Emporia, boards attempted to secede from county-wide

182

Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
103
510 F .2d at 1359·60.
184
/d. at 1360.
16!iJd.
188
/d. at 1361. The court also believed the remedy appropriate because the school
boundaries and city limits of Louisville were not coterminous, and the presence of
almost 10,000 children. mostly white. between the two lines ~ggravated the problem.
/d.
u'7448 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971).
188
407 U.S~ 451 (1972).
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desegregation plans. In each case, the court focused upon the
adverse effects of the action which would ultimately have created an
69
interdistrict violation if allowed to attain fruition! As stated by the
court in Lee, "'fhe city cannot secede from the county where the effect- to say nothing of the purpose- of the secession has a subs tantial adverse effect on the desegregation of the county school
170
distriet." The violation was actually prevented in both of these
cases, but their precedential value is in their analyses. The courts'
relative indifference to the element of intent in these cases explains,
to a certain extent, the acceptability of decisions in which legislatures were involved. Courts have-often looked to the segregative effect
as of utmost importance, with segregative. purpose
as a secondary con.
sideration.
9. Interdistrict Violations by State Legislatures.- Several interdistrict violations have been found and corrected within the se·
cond Milliken category in which the state legislature or the state
school board, rather than the local school district, has promulgated a
violative policy or statute. Violations of this nature usually involve
the drawing or redrawing of district lines, but the manner of finding
intent sometimes differs.
The Eighth Circuit has been particularly active in correcting
segregation flowing from legislative actions. In Haney v~ County
Board of Education,tn a 1970 Arkansas case, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals ordered the annexation of a black sc-hool district to
a larger, more populous, white district in order to achieve a "unitary
172
non·racial school system." A prior opinion in the litigation justified
the remedy in this fashion: Because the state of Arkansas had re173
quired separate schools for blacks and whites, school district lines
drawn for school reorganization had racial contours and were
violative as a matter of law because they were a reflection of that
174
earlier policy .
175
Five years later, in United States v. Mis_souri, the Eighth Circuit again ordered annexation of a racially identifiable school
176
district. The district in question had been separated from the
.

F.2d at 752': 407 U.S. at 462.
110
448 F.2d at 752.
111
429 F .2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).
u19448

/d. at

112

369~

Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 4.10 F~2d 920~ 923-24 (8th Cir. 1969).
114
/d. at 926. The school districts were not required to be distinctly separate, ~'[b]ut
the fact that the variou$ reorganized districts in Sevier County reflect a bi";racial
system of education by district Jines must be accepted as more than mere coincidence."
/d. at 924.
115
515 F .2d 1365 (8th Cir .), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
173

515 F.2d at 1373.
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other adjacent districts in 1937 and had been excluded ever since
177
from reorganization plans formulated by the county and state. The
court ordered its annexation with two adjoining districts on the
basis of intent as found in Keyes. and later in Columbus and Dayton
178
//:
"Intentional school segregation in the past may not be ignored
in assessing the impact of present inaction which has the effect of
179
maintaining segregation."
Very recently. another Arkansas case was decided which involved
a fact situation similar to that in Haney- district lines were drawn
as a reflection of the same statute. But in Morrilton School District
180
No. 92 v. United States, rather than finding purpose as a matter of
law the court of appeals followed much the same reasoning as was
used in United States v. Missouri. It found that the impact of the
181
discriminatory statute was still being felt; therefore, sufficient intent was present to justify an interdistrict remedy to eliminate all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 182
An interesting and distinctively northern case in which both the
school board and legislature created the need for an interdistrict
183
remedy is Evans v. Buchanan. That case dealt with the school
segregation situation within and without Wilmington, Delaware.
Delaware, at one time, had state-imposed segregation!84 Even
after Brown /, New Castle County schools were involved in a
185
transfer system across district lines
which, as in Louisville,
established a certain amount of interdependence among the districts. For many years, the only high school in the county that would
accept black students was in Wilmington itself. Consequently, crossdistrict transportation of blacks was required. 186 Also, the district
court in Evans found that various governmental authorities had contributed
to
the
racial
disparity
between
the
city
and
the
rest
of
the
.
187
county, in much the same manner the district court in Indianapolis
•

•

117

Id. at 1370.
118
See text accompanying notes 149-55 supra.
179
515 F.2d at 1370.
180
606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
181
606 F .2d at 225-26.
182
/d. at 228-29.
183
393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). The litigation began as one
of the companion cases in Brown .I under the designation, Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del.
Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (1952). Because there have been so many reported opinions, this
Note will confine itself to the district court opinions which found the constitutional
violation to require interdistrict relief and which granted the remedy.
184
393 F. Supp. at 432.
185
/d. at 433.
188Id.
187
/d. at 438. This action helped create a situation whereby 75°.4l of the county's
black students attended school in Wilmington. ld. at 439.
•
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188

These violations included
189
acts by the New Castle County Housing Authority and discrimination in the private housing market sanctioned by state officials until
90
1968! One of the more decisive factors in the Wilmington case,
however, was the passage of the Education Advancement Act of
191
1968. This Act provided for school reorganization throughout the
state with the exception of Wilmington. The Act also included factors to be considered when reorganizing but failed to include any
criterion for reorganization on the basis of race. Therefore, the court
held that the statute created a suspect racial classification 192 which
contributed to segregation by maintaining district lines on the basis
of race. 193
In addition to the segregative cross-district transactions, the
court inferred seg.r egative intent from the impact of all the other
194
more "neutral" actions. On the basis of these violations, the court
declared pertinent provisions of the legislative act .. nonconstitutional"195 and, a year later, ordered the consolidation of most of the
196
county's school districts.
From these representative cases, it is evident that determining
intent when considering an interdistrict remedy is a much less
strenuous task once intradistrict de jure segregation has been
found. A court's emphasis is upon the additional segregative impact
of the official actions rather than upon the purpose for which they
were formulated. Attributing such importance to impact is consistent with the renewed Supreme Court attitude that the affirmative
duty to dismantle de jure segregation will not allow any hindrance
or inaction to stop its full fruition. The Indianapolis case came at the
right time and involved the right type of violation.
•

VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE INDIANAPOLIS CASE

A.

Non-Educational Violations

The Indianapolis litigation has one component present in few
other cases: the state actions which affected school desegregation
were only tangentially concerned with education.
188

See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
18
i393 F. Supp. at 435.
190
/d. at 434.
lln56 Del. Laws, ch. 292, § 6 (1968) (current version at DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 14, §§
1001 to 1005 (Supp. 1980)).
192
393 F. Supp. at 442.
193
/d. at 445-46.
19
./d. at 438, 442-43.
5
' ' /d. at 447.
198
Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328. 353 (D. Del. 1976).
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The two factors purporting to cause interdistrict segregation in
the schools- Uni-Gov and HACI-did not have the educational emphasis that school board actions or legislative redistricting have had.
The district court could have found a legitimate state purpose for
the creation of Uni-Gov and could have corrected the housing violation without taking affirmative action with respect to the schools.
Metropolitan reorganization and public housing can have a
distinct impact upon a school system, but their purposes are to affect altogether different aspects of society. If there were a segregative intent involved in these kinds of decisions, their cure would
eventually eliminate their respective constitutional violations as
well as school segregation. Cases have arisen which deal with these
kinds of state actions individually. One case has even demonstrated
that the issue of school desegregation does not alter the consideration of such a state action on its own merits~J
198
In Higgins v. Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit confronted
a situation much like the problem encountered with Uni-Gov. The
reasoning of this case could have been used to justify the propriety
of maintaining pre-existing school district boundaries within UniGov. The Michigan legislature passed a senate bill which changed
prior law by preventing the boundaries of a school district from ex99
panding with civil annexation in second-class cities.t Certain
suburbs of Grand Rapids actively supported and partially financed
200
this bill which would affect only Grand Rapids and one other city .
Although the question concerning an interdistrict remedy was
mooted by the fact that Grand Rapids was not operating a
segregated system, the court of appeals nevertheless determined
that there was no constitutional violation in the passage of the
201
senate bill. The bill was justified on the grounds that surburban
school districts would otherwise lose a substantial portion of their
tax bases because most of the areas annexed were industrial. and
202
the few children affected did not warrant such a loss.
The propriety of the boundary problem created by Uni-Gov
could also have been justified with a more specialized test for intent.
A focus on legislative intent rather than segregative intent might
have garnered sufficient governmental justification to overcome the
97

91

See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444 (W.O. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 508
F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
98
' 395 F. Supp. 444 (W .D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 508 F .2d 779 (6th Cir. 197 4).
199
395 F. Supp. at 473. Senate Bill 1100 was modified to become Act 177 of Public
Acts of 1962 and is currently found at MICH. COMP. LAws § 380.401 (Supp. 1980-81)
where it differs in substance because of school reorganization.
200
395 F. Supp. at 473.
20
'508 F.2d 779, 797 (6th Cir. 1974).
202
395 F. Supp. at 474.
'
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suspicion of an illicit discriminatory purpose. 203 Metropolitan
reorganization has importance on its own merit without regard to
its tangential effect upon schools.
The other anomaly in the Indianapolis case is the interdistrict
204
effect attributed to housing. Hills v. Gautreaux, a 1976 Supreme
Court case, effectuated an interdistrict housing remedy for viola·
tions by the Chicago .H ousing Authority and the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The offense
was entirely within Chicago's c·ity limits, the only location where the
two agencies had se.lected sites for public housing 205 although they
had the power to operate within a three-mile radius from the city
208
limits. The Court determined in Hills that the district court had
authority to force HUD to start selecting sites and assistance outside of Chicago, the power to do so already having been conferred
207
208
by law. Unlike the schools in Milliken, there would be much less
disturbance of local control because the agencies were not authorized
09
to seek locations within other incorporated areas} No relief, was
ordered for those people currently living at the discriminatorily
selected sites, but -then, unlike the Indianapolis case. the issue of
school desegregation demanding immediate relief was not involved.
With HACI's violations, it would have been simple to stop at a housing remedy which would have effectuated school desegregation
sooner or laterf. and probably would have been less expensive for
210
the school board.
This consideration, as well as the arguably
legitimate state purpose for Uni-Gov, had to have created substan·
tial problems in justifying an interdistrict des·e gregation order. At
least one circuit court judge recognize.d this.
.

.

. .

B.

. .

.

.

.

Dissension in the Indianapolis Case

When reading the 1980 Seventh Circuit opinion of Indianapol_
is
V, one wonders whether the majority and the dissent are speaking
of the same case. Circuit Judge Tone, whose research into the prob211
lem forc_e d him to change his vote in Indianapolis IV, wrote three

See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative· Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 131.
203

425 u.s. 284 (1976).
205
/d. at 286.
200
/d. at 298 n.14~
207
/d. at 306.
204

418 u.8. 717 (197 4).
209
425 U.S. at 298-99 n.l4.
•
21
°Comment, Housing Remedies in School Desegregation Cases: The View from
Indianapolis, 12 HARV. C.R.-G.L.L. REV. 649, 687 (1977).
211
541 F.2d at 1224 n.* (Tone, J., dissenting).
208

•
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strong dissents based specifically on the failure to demonstrate
212
segregative purpose. His most recent dissent disputes the majority's
conclusion that the Uni-Gov act and HACI evinced the requisite intent for supporting an interdistrict remedy.
Judge Tone did not view the Uni-Gov act as fulfilling the Arlington Heights fact~rs as they were used by the majority and the
•
district court. He found no historical background of the act itself
213
that showed segregative purpose. He also concluded that past rejections of proposed consolidation in Marion County were warranted
214
by financial reasons and the goal of local school district autonomy .
He completed his repudiation of Uni-Gov's role in the controversy
by pointing out that the repeal of the statute, which had made
school boundaries coterminous with civil annexation, was unnecessary because Uni-Gov was not an annexation by the city but
215
rather a governmental reorganization imposed by the state.
As for HACI, Judge Tone minimized its actual effect by explaining that its function in site selection was limited. Most of the locations were selected by a "turn-key" method, whereby a private
developer selects the site and turns the project over to the housing
216
authority after it is built. The remaining sites were selected by a
217
HACI's involvement was therefore de
mayoral task force.
minimus. Judge Tone thus bemoaned the majority's reliance upon
the disparate racial impact of a de facto situation, the only rationale
218
he perceived as actually supporting the decision.
•

C.

The Indianapolis Case

A Result-Oriented Decision?

Indianapolis V was a case whose time had come. Nine years had
been spent litigating essentially the same issue, the interdistrict
remedy. As a newly applicable Supreme Court opinion was handed
down, the case was returned to the district court. First, there was
219
220
Milliken v. Bradley. Then, there were Arlington Heights and
212

/d. at 1224 (Tone, J ., dissenting): 637 F.2d at 1119 (Tone, J .. dissenting): 573 F .2d
at 415 (Tone, J., dissenting). Judge Tone's dissent in Indianapolis IV warned the court
of appeals of the deficiency in its decision because it did not include a finding of intent
as prescribed by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). He further denounced the
majority's reliance upon a .. 'racial impact',. theory. 541 F.2d at 1227 (Tone, J., dissenting).
2 3
' /ndianapolis V, 637 F .2d at 1119·20 (Tone, J ., dissenting).
214
/d. at 1121 n.14. This is similar to the rationale accepted in the Higgins case.
See text accompanying notes 198·202 supra.
.
wr;637 F.2d at 1122 (Tone, J., dissenting).
21
"'/d. at 1125·26 (Tone, J ., dissenting).
217
/d. at 1126 (Tone, J ., dissenting).
2
'"/d. at 1129-30 (Tone, J ., dissenting).
219
418
717 (1974).
220
429
252 (1977).
I

u.s.
u.s.
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Washington v. Davis. Actually, the most important decisions were
223
222
Columbus
and Dayton //, two cases which could have considerably eased the burden of finding segregative intent in Indianapolis if they had been decided sooner.
In the Indianapolis V decision, the district court and the court of
appeals, to a certain degree, contorted a school desegregation case
to fit into the molds of housing and employment decisions. The
analyses from these kinds of cases are generally inapplicable in a
school desegregation case, except that a finding of segregative intent is re.q uired and disparate racial impact alone is insufficient. In
the Indianapolis case, the courts did an excellent, but at times unconvincing, job. The fault is not theirs; it lies with a lack of
guidance. And yet, no blame can fairly be laid upon the Supreme
Court either. School cases differ too much to afford a disc·e rnible
pattern to their offenses and cures. Since Brown I, the Court has accepted various kinds of "segregative intent'' and has drawn the line
224
only when intent cannot be found at all. That is why Indianapolis
IV had to be remanded- no claim of segregative intent had been
made. And that is why Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights
were suggested as the ruling authority- not because they instructed upon finding intent in the school context but because they
simply required that segregative intent must be found to create a
constitutional violation under equal protection.
There are two explanations of why Indianapolis V was not overturned. First, the litigation after Indianapolis I involved essentially
a remedy case, as opposed to a violation case. Dual level litigation
involving both violation and remedy stages is not atypical because
'

I

•

[t]he school desegregation problem usually is divided into the
violation and the remedy stages. In the first stage, the Court
seeks to determine whether the school board or another
state agency engaged in unconstitutional discrimination; the
second prescribes the contours of the plan necessary to correct
the violations. T·he difficulty in the first stage is in going ... to
the determination that the conduct was intentional or pur225
posive discrimination.
'

.

Different considerations are inherent in each phase. In the Inwith
a
finddianapolis case, the initial violation stage was concluded
.
221

u.s.

426
229 (1976).
m443 U.S. 449 (1979}.
223
443 u.s. 526 (1979).
n•No intent to support an interdistrict remedy was found in Milliken, 418 U.S. at
745~
'
225
Lane, The Principles and Politics of Equal Protection: Reflections on Crawford
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 10 Sw~ U .L. REV. 499, 521 n.107 (1978).
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ing of de jure segregation in IPS in 1971. The ensuing nine years
were spent vindicating the proposed remedy. Segregative intent
still has to be found to justify an interdistrict remedy because the
extent of any desegregation order must be justified by an
226
equivalent violation. But a brief survey of interdistrict cases has
shown that once a de jure intradistrict system is discovered, very
little further proof of intent is demanded. Thus, it appears that
Milliken, in which an interdistrict remedy was denied. is the exceptional case rather than the rule.
It is also possible that Indianapolis V would have been just as
acceptable even if it had been decided upon the racial impact theory
denounced by Circuit Judge Tone. Indianapolis had a de jure segregated school system at the time of trial, and there had been an affirmative duty to dismantle it since 1954. If Brown I is considered a
court-imposed mandate to desegregate a dual system, an analogy
can be made to the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
227
Scotland Neck City . Board of Education. In that case, a legislature
attempted to carve out a new school district in the face of a court
order. " '[I]f a state-imposed limitation . . . operates to inhibit or
228
obstruct ... the disestablishing of a dual system, it must fall. '"
HACI and Uni-Gov are those "state-imposed limitations" which
prevented "the disestablishing of a dual system." The necessary intent, therefore, could have been established by this duty to desegregate IPS combined with the foreseeable consequences of disparate
racial impact and interdistrict effect from Uni-Gov and HACI activities.229 These factors · would most likely have been sufficient indications of segregative intent for a Court which had just handed
down Columbus and Dayton II.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Unlike many commentaries on school desegregation cases, this
one has a conclusion. There is no need to speculate as to what might
happen in the next phase of litigation. Later issues arising in the Indianapolis case will not deal with the essential constitutional problem that took nine long years and almost a whole generation of
230
school children to finish. The case began with the IPS intradistrict
226

Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977).
227
407
484 (1972).
228
/d. at 488 (quoting North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45
(1971 )).
229
1t must be remembered that the Court has denigrated the intent standard used
to find HACI violations, the Omaha presumption. See note 142 supra. ·
230
1t will be interesting to note how the case in St. Louis will be decided in the
wake of Indianapolis V. In the most recent St. Louis opinion, the court has required

u.s.
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violation, but the struggle centered around an interdistrict remedy
for which no equivalent violation had initially been determined. At
the conclusion of the lengthy litigation, the district court and the
court of appeals justified the interdistrict relief by concluding that
two governmental non-educational forces were motivated by segregative purposes. This finding fulfilled the Supreme Court's
desideratum that only de jure, purposefuL segregation can be
judicially corrected. The case therefore ended with a remedy for a
violation.
The decision in the Indianapolis case will be difficult to follow
because school cases make poor factual precedent. However, it is an
excellent example of the effects of changing law and the individuality
of each case. There probably will never be one definitive approach
to finding segregative intent in school cases. Unlike housing and
employment cases, school desegregation cases cannot be defined in
terms of a single practice or decision. 231 The historical backgr·o und,
alleged violations, and school organization, among other factors, differ in school cases making them more difficult to judge than other
kinds of equal protection litigation.
Another difference that sets school cases apart from other equal
protection cases is their remedies. In school desegregation cases, the
effects of the discrimination are continuously operating upon the
children and cannot be cured as simply as other equal protection
violations. In housing and employment cases, an injunction or a
remedial order for the immediate plaintiffs can be instituted. But in
school cases, the affected parties can only receive appropriate relief
in some form of affirmative action, such as consolidation or busing.
The Indianapolis case also demonstrates another problem en·
countered in most northern school cases- absent overt discrimination, courts are compelled to infer intent in these cases. There are
no guidelines for this procedure, which creates difficulties for the
courts. The Indianapolis case shows the weakness in this kind of
judicial treatment because a remand to the lower courts was required as each new pertinent decision was handed down.
But there is also strength in the flexibility inherent in this approach. Flexibility has allowed courts to look toward a result before
a constitutional violation is actually found and to. remedy segre.gative conditions that are more suggestive of de facto conditions
than de jure. The continuing nature of school desegregation violations and the adverse consequences they can enge·n der necessitate
the joinder of outlying districts in order to determine whether an interdistrict re-m edy
would be appropriate. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1295·96 (8th Cir. 1980)
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 88 (1980).
231
Lane, supra note 225, at 521 n.l07.
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such strong action, perhaps upon less proof of discriminatory intent
than in other cases. This is where the Indianapolis case fits. The
litigation was result~oriented, an approach that the Supreme Court
seems to have accepted without quarrel. If a court can find the
slightest indicium of segregative intent or a former de jure system .
with a failure to affirmatively dismantle it, a desegregation order is
not likely to be overturned absent an inequitable remedy.
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